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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this court is proper, and not disputed by the plaintiff. A 
final judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff on cross motions for 
summary judgment. The arguments were made to the Honorable John R. 
Anderson in the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for the County of 
Uintah. On October 3, 1996, Judge Anderson signed an order granting 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court had appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2. The Supreme Court 
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS CENTRAL TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-3. 
Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-3.1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 17, 1994, Joseph Price was a passenger in a vehicle owned 
and operated by David Gurr. The vehicle in which he was a passenger rolled, 
ejecting Joseph Price and resulting in his death. 
Debra Turney ("Turney"), the defendant in this case is the natural 
mother of Joseph Price. Turney pursued a liability claim with Atlanta 
Casualty Insurance Company, the liability carrier providing coverage for David 
Gurr. Atlanta Casualty paid its policy limits of $25,000.00. 
Turney filed a claim based on the insurance policy issued to Split 
Mountain Construction by American States Insurance ("American States"). A 
copy of that policy is included in the record. (R10-53). 
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The American States policy consists of two parts, a commercial general 
liability coverage form and a business auto coverage form. 
On August 3 1 , 1995, American States filed this lawsuit seeking a 
declaratory judgment action pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-33-1 to 
determine whether coverage was provided under the policy. 
Each party filed a motion for summary judgment in the case. On 
September 18, 1996, oral arguments were held on both motions for summary 
judgment. 
The trial court, Judge J o h n R. Anderson presiding, granted the 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. 
A summary judgment order concluding the declaratory judgment action 
and granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, was signed by 
Judge Anderson on October 3, 1996. (R202-3) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The American States insurance policy provides coverage to a partnership 
insured under the name of Split Mountain Construction. John Turney is a 
partner in that business. Debra Turney is John Tumey's spouse. Joseph Price 
is Debra Turney's son who was killed in an automobile accident. The 
American States insurance policy provides no under insured automobile 
coverage for Price's accident. The insurance policy only provides coverage for 
the partnership, and for the partners and their spouses if they are engaged in 
business activities. That is not the case with Price. Accordingly, there is no 
insurance coverage under the American States' policy. 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly determined that the Split Mountain Construction is a 
partnership, and a separate entity from its partners, for purposes of 
determining the insurance coverage that applies. 
The real question raised in this appeal is what form of business Split 
Mounta in Cons t ruc t ion was operat ing under , and based on t h a t 
determinat ion what insurance coverage existed for Split Mountain 
Construction under the American States policy. There is different coverage for 
sole proprietorships than there is for partnerships under the terms of the 
American States insurance policy. 
Section II of the American States policy is entitled "WHO IS AN 
INSURED" that section states as follows: 
1. If you are designated in the Declarations as: 
a an individual, you and your spouse are insured, but 
only with respect to the conduct of the business of 
which you are the sole owner. 
b. a partnership or joint venture, you are an insured. 
Your members, your partners, and their spouses are 
also insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of 
your business. 
c. an organization other than a partnership or joint 
venture, you are an insured. Your "executive officers" 
and directors are insureds, but only with respect to 
their duties as your officers or directors. Your 
stockholders are also insureds, but only with respect 
to their liability as stockholders. 
The declaration sheets of the insurance policy are clear that the type of 
business insured is a partnership. On the coversheet for the declarations the 
form says named insured. Next to that, the form has been typed in "VENT 
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SLAUGH & JOHN TURNEY DBA: SPLIT MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION." (R178) 
Commercial Liability Coverage Part Declarations, Page CGI (R179), list the 
named insured as "VENT SLAUGH & JOHN TURNEY DBA:" Immediately 
under that it says "Form of Business: Partnership." (R179) Split Mountain 
Construct ion h a s always represented itself to American Sta tes as a 
partnership. The partners are Vent Slaugh and John Turney. John Turney's 
spouse Debra, is the mother of Joseph Price. Debra Turney is seeking to obtain 
underinsured motorist coverage for Joseph's accident. 
An audit request was sent to Split Mountain Construction. The audit 
requested information regarding the operation of the business . The form 
stated "Are You Operating As:" Then listed: " Individual Partnership 
Corporation Other." The defendant checked "Partnership." On the 
same form, the owners are listed as "John M. Turney, 51%" and 'Vent Slaugh, 
49%." The document was filled out, and signed by, Debbie Turney, the 
defendant in this case. The document was dated September 25, 1995. (R182) 
It is clear that there are two individuals working together as co-owners 
of the Split Mountain Construction business. They are running the business 
to make a profit. Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-3 defines a partnership as; "an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for 
profit." Utah Code Annotated § 48-1-3.1 defines a joint venture. It states: "A 
joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners of a single business enterprise." The defendant has not attempted to 
present any evidence that Split Mountain is not a partnership or a joint 
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venture. Instead, the defendant's attempt to argue from cases that are not on 
point, that the partners also are insureds in their individual capacity. The 
plaintiffs reasoning is not consistent with Utah law. 
"[T]he Utah Supreme Court has ruled that partnerships are distinct and 
separate legal entities." Salt Lake Knee Rehab, v. Salt Lake Medicine, 909 P.2d 
266 (Ut. App. 1995). Citing Cottonwood Mall Co., v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501 
(Ut. 1988). The court further stated that partnerships are distinct and 
separate legal entities from the partners. Id. at 269 citing Wall Inv. Co. v. 
Garden Gate Distrib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Ut. 1979). 
The defendant's reliance on Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc., 373 N.W. 2d 
902 (N.D. 1985), is not instructive to the court in this case. In Carlson the 
individual insured was operating several businesses as a sole proprietor under 
his own name. In that case, the court held: "A sole proprietorship which is 
conducted under a trade name is not a separate legal entity." Carlson at 905. 
Plaintiff does not dispute this point which is basic hornbook law. If the 
defendant in this case was doing business as a sole proprietor the coverage 
issues raised would be different. The same is true of the defendant's reliance 
on the case of O'Hanlan v. Harford Accident and Indemnity Company, 639 
F.2d 1019(3dCir. 1981). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines sole proprietorship as follows: "A form of 
business in which one person owns all the assets of the business in contrast 
to a partnership incorporation. The sole proprietor is solely liable for all the 
debts of the business." (Black's Law Dictionary abridged to the Fifth Edition 
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at 723.) Where there is no separate business entity the issues are completely 
different. The cases that the defendant relies on involve sole proprietorship, 
where the individual and business, are the same legal entity. That is not the 
same issue which this court must address. 
It is clear that Split Mountain Construction is doing business as a 
partnership or joint venture as defined by Utah statutes. Accordingly, Section 
11(1 )(b) of the American States policy is the applicable section to determine who 
was an insured. Based on the language of that provision of the policy which 
states: If you are "A Partnership, or Joint Venture, you are an insured. Your 
members, your partners, and their spouses are also insured, bu t only with 
respect to the conduct of your business." Accordingly, the Split Mountain 
partnership is insured; Mr. Slaugh and Mr. Turney, as members or partners, are 
also insureds as are their spouses relative to conducting their business. None 
of the defined insured include Price. 
Even though the American States policy is written as a business policy, 
the defendant attempts to argue that the coverage is for individuals, because 
the individual partners are listed by name "dba Split Mountain Construction." 
It is clear that the words "Vent Slaugh and John Turney, dba Split Mountain 
Construction" show that two individuals are doing business as a partnership 
or joint venture. Only the partnership or joint venture is an insured. The 
individuals named are not doing business as sole proprietors. There is no 
coverage for Joseph Price in this case. 
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Whether Price is a "Family Member" is a question of fact. 
Based on the previous arguments of plaintiff, plaintiff does not believe 
that the issue of whether Joseph Price was a family member is relevant to this 
appeal. However, if the court decides that the issue is relevant, it is a factual 
question which must decided by the trial court. The defendant improperly 
relies on the affidavit that was filed by her in this matter. That affidavit, 
however, was submitted to the court unsigned at the time the plaintiffs reply 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment was filed. The 
affidavit is improper and should not be considered. Accordingly, if this court 
decides tha t the issue is relevant for this appeal, this matter should be 
remanded to the trial court to rule on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff urges this court to affirm the district court's granting of its 
motion for summary judgment. The insurance policy involved in this litigation 
is a business insurance policy that provides coverage to the partnership of 
Split Mountain Construction. There is no coverage provided for Joseph Price. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff respectfully requests that this court affirm the trial 
court's decision. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 1997. 
DUNN & DUNN 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
KEVIN D. SWENSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§ 48-1-3 "PARTNERSHIP' DEFINED 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§ 48-1-3.1 JOINT VENTURE DEFINED 
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835 PARTNERSHIP 48-1-6 
Section 
48-1-39. Rights of retiring or estate of deceased par tner 
when the business is continued. 
48-1-40. Accrual of actions. 
Part 2 
Utah Limited Liabil ity 
Partnership Act 
48-1-41. Title. 
48-1-42. Registration of limited liability partnerships. 
48-1-43. Scope of chapter — Choice of law. 
48-1-44. Foreign limited liability partnerships. 
48-1-45. Name of registered limited liability partnership. 
48-1-46. Professional relationship — Personal liability. 
48-1-47. Regulatory agency or board authority — Prohi-
bitions on individuals apply. 
48-1-48. Limited liability partnerships providing profes-
sional services. 
P A R T I 
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 
48-1-1. Definit ion of terms. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Bankrupt" includes "bankrupt" under the federal 
bankruptcy laws or "insolvent" under any state insolvency 
law. 
(2) "Business" includes every trade, occupation, or pro-
fession. 
(3) "Conveyance" includes every assignment, lease, 
mortgage, or encumbrance. 
(4) "Court" includes every court and judge having ju-
risdiction in the case. 
(5) "Limited liability partnership" means a general 
partnership registered under Section 48-1-42 and comply-
ing with Section 48-1-43. 
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, lim-
ited liability company, limited liability partnership, cor-
poration, or other association. 
(7) "Real property" includes land and any interest or 
estate in land. 1994 
48-1-2. Interpretat ion of knowledge a n d not ice . 
(1) Within the meaning of this chapter, a person is deemed 
to have knowledge of a fact not only when he has actual 
knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such 
other facts tha t to act in disregard of them shows bad faith. 
(2) A person has notice of a fact within the meaning of this 
chapter when the person who claims the benefit of the notice: 
(a) states the fact to such person; or 
(b) delivers through the mail, or by other means of 
communication, a written statement of the fact to such 
person, or to a proper person 'at his place of business or 
residence. 1953 
48-1-3. "Partnership" denned. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a partnership 
is an association of two or more persons to carry on as 
coowners a business for profit. 
(b) "Partnership" when used in a s tatute of the state, 
includes a limited liability partnership registered under 
Section 48-1-42, unless the context requires otherwise. 
(2) An association formed under any other s tatute of this 
state, or any statute adopted by authority other than the 
authority of this state, is not a partnership under this chapter, 
Unless such association would have been a partnership in this 
state prior to the adoption of this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall apply to limited partnerships except 
in so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are 
inconsistent herewith. 1994 
48-1-3.1. Jo int venture d e n n e d — Appl icat ion of chap-
ter. 
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons 
to carry on as co-owners of a single business enterprise. 
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of 
joint ventures. 1985 
48-1-4. Rules for d e t e r m i n i n g the e x i s t e n c e of a part-
nership. 
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules 
shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who 
are not partners as to each other are not par tners as to 
third persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by en-
tireties, joint property, common property, or part owner-
ship does not of itself establish a partnership, whether 
such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by the 
use of the property. 
(3) The sharing of gross re turns does not of itself 
establish a partnership, whether or not the persons shar-
ing them have a joint or common right or interest in any 
property from which the re turns are derived. 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a 
business is prima facie evidence tha t he is a partner in the 
business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such 
profits were received in payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a 
deceased partner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of 
payment vary with the profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will 
of a business or other property by installments or 
otherwise. 1953 
48-1-5. Partnership property. 
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, 
or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account 
of the partnership, is partnership property. 
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired 
with partnership funds is partnership property. 
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partner-
ship name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the 
partnership name. 
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, 
though without words of inheritance, passes the entire estate 
of the grantor, unless a contrary intent appears. 1953 
48-1-6. Partner agent of partnership as to partnership 
bus iness . 
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the 
purpose of its business, and the act of every partner, including 
the execution in the partnership name of any instrument for 
apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the 
partnership of which he is a member, binds the partnership, 
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for 
the partnership in the particular mat ter and the person with 
whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact tha t he has no 
such authority. 
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the 
carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way • 
does not bind the partnership, unless authorized by the other 
partners. 
